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1 
LIVING A LIE: WHY “DON’T ASK DON’T 
TELL” PRESENTS AN UNWORKABLE VIEW 
OF PERSONHOOD 
Melissa Bordeaux* 
Abstract: A fundamental conflict exists between the understanding of 
personhood in asylum law and its conception in military law. Asylum law 
in the United States and the United Kingdom recognizes homosexuality 
as a fundamental characteristic of personhood, which cannot be con-
cealed. Conversely, “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” the statutory ban on gays serv-
ing openly in the U.S. Military, demands complete suppression of any in-
dication of homosexuality. This Comment argues that, in light of the 
framework for examining personhood most recently articulated by the 
U.K. Supreme Court, the arguments in favor of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” are 
both specious and destructive. This Comment proceeds first by examin-
ing the understanding of personhood in asylum law. It then contrasts this 
understanding with the demands and restrictions that “Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell” imposes on homosexual military personnel. Finally, this Comment 
concludes by calling for a uniform application of the view of personhood 
found in asylum law. 
Introduction 
 As courts issue more and more decisions recognizing the rights of 
homosexuals, the statutory ban on gays in the military, commonly 
known as “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” stands as a reminder of an antiquated 
and unworkable view of personhood in U.S. law.1 In HJ v. Secretary of 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3015 (2010) (holding Hastings College of Law does not have to 
provide funding and official recognition to Christian group that violates its “all-comers” 
policy by refusing to allow homosexuals to join); Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 
716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 923, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that “the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Act 
infringes the fundamental rights of United States servicemembers” and “violates the Fifth 
and First Amendments” of the Constitution); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921, 927, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding Proposition 8, a voter-enacted amendment to the 
California Constitution which prohibits same-sex couples from marrying, “unconstitution-
ally burdens the exercise of the fundamental right to marry and creates an irrational clas-
sification on basis of sexual orientation”); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 
374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding federal Defense of Marriage Act serves no “identifiable 
 
2 Boston College Third World Law Journal Vol. 31: E. Supp. 
State for the Home Department, the U.K. Supreme Court issued an elo-
quent statement on sexuality and personhood, which unanimously re-
jected the notion that homosexuals can be forced to hide their sexual-
ity.2 U.S. asylum law similarly recognizes that homosexuals cannot be 
required to hide their sexuality in order to avoid persecution.3 This 
understanding of personhood, found in both U.S. and U.K. asylum law, 
illuminates the absurdity of a policy codified in U.S. law prohibiting 
homosexuals from serving openly in the military.4 
 This Comment argues that the understanding of personhood most 
recently elucidated by the U.K. Supreme Court and already embraced 
by U.S. asylum law should be incorporated into U.S. military policy.5 By 
recognizing the right to live freely and openly without fear of harm, the 
United States will eliminate the glaringly inconsistent and harmful 
                                                                                                                      
legitimate purpose or discrete objective,” but rather exists solely “to disadvantage a group 
of which [Congress] disapproves”); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 253 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding provision under federal Defense 
of Marriage Act defining marriage as union of one man and one woman to be an uncon-
stitutional infringement on the authority of the state “to recognize same-sex marriages 
among its residents” and to afford them the “benefits, rights, and privileges” that accom-
pany their marital status); Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. and 
N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that Florida law prohibiting 
adoption by gay men and lesbians is unconstitutional). 
2 See HJ v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] UKSC 31, [11], [113]–[118] (ap-
peal taken from Eng.) (discussing homosexuality as an immutable characteristic that can-
not be concealed). 
3 See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding that a ho-
mosexual Cuban man was entitled to a stay of deportation because he faced persecution 
resulting from his membership in a particular social group as a homosexual). In 1994, 
Attorney General Janet Reno issued an executive order declaring as precedent the holding 
in Toboso-Alfonso that homosexuals constitute a particular social group so as to receive pro-
tection under the Refugee Convention. See Immigration Equal. & Midwest Immigrant and 
Human Rights Ctr., Winning Asylum, Withholding and CAT Cases Based on Sexual Orientation, 
Transgender Identity and/or HIV-Positive Status, Immigr. Equality, http://immigration 
equality.org/manual_template.php?id=1064#D_1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). 
4 Compare 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (codifying U.S. military policy that homosexual ser-
vice members must conceal their sexuality or be discharged from the military, commonly 
referred to as “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”), with Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d. 1163, 1171–73 
(9th Cir. 2005) (noting that sexuality is a fundamental characteristic that homosexuals 
cannot be required to hide); Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 
2000) (discussing homosexuality as an immutable characteristic that cannot be changed), 
and HJ, [2010] UKSC at [11], [35], [115] (declaring that homosexual asylum seekers cannot 
be expected to conceal their sexuality because it is a fundamental aspect of identity). 
5 See Karouni, 399 F.3d. at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093–94; Toboso-Alfonso, 
20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23; HJ, [2010] UKSC at [82]–[83]. 
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treatment of homosexuals embodied in “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.”6 Part I 
examines the understanding of personhood set out by the U.K. Su-
preme Court in HJ. Part II discusses the treatment of homosexuals in 
U.S. asylum law, showing that the view of personhood recently adopted 
by the U.K. Supreme Court has existed as U.S. legal precedent since 
1994. Part III provides an overview of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” the statu-
tory ban on homosexuals in the military, in terms of the restrictions 
and demands it places on homosexual service members. Finally, Part IV 
concludes by advocating for the United States to apply in the military 
context the view of personhood outlined by the U.K. Supreme Court in 
HJ and found in U.S. asylum law. Adopting a uniform understanding of 
personhood would require repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” because 
homosexual service members could no longer be required to hide a 
fundamental aspect of their identity. 
I. The View of Personhood Adopted by the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom 
 The U.K. Secretary of State for the Home Department (“Home 
Secretary”) denied asylum to HJ and HT, homosexual men from Iran 
and Cameroon, respectively.7 In both Iran and Cameroon, homosexual-
ity is a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment.8 In Iran, it is a 
crime punishable by death for consenting adults to engage in homosex-
                                                                                                                      
6 See 10 U.S.C. § 654; Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 
1093–94; Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23; HJ, [2010] UKSC at [11], [76]–[78], 
[92]. 
7 See HJ v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] UKSC 31, [4]–[5] (appeal taken 
from Eng.). The U.K. Border Agency defines asylum as follows: 
Asylum is protection given by a country to someone who is fleeing persecu-
tion in their own country. It is given under the 1951 United Nations Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees. To be recognized as a refugee, you 
must have left your country and be unable to go back because you have a 
well-founded fear of persecution. 
Asylum, U.K. Border Agency, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum (last visited Feb. 
15, 2011). 
8 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, 2009 Human Rights Report: Cameroon, 
U.S. Department of State (March 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ hrrpt/ 
2009/af/135942.htm (“Homosexual activity is illegal and punishable by a prison sentence of 
six months to five years and a fine ranging from 20,000 to 200,000 CFA ($40 to $400).”); 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009 Human Rights Report: Iran, U.S. De-
partment of State (March 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/ 
136068.htm [hereinafter Human Rights Report: Iran] (“[Iranian] law prohibits and punishes 
homosexual conduct . . . .”). 
4 Boston College Third World Law Journal Vol. 31: E. Supp. 
ual acts.9 After being denied asylum, despite the legally enforced perse-
cution in their home countries, HJ and HT appealed the Home Secre-
tary’s decision to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT), and both 
appeals were dismissed.10 The appellants appealed the AIT decisions to 
the U.K. Court of Appeal, and their appeals were again dismissed.11 In 
HJ’s case, the Court of Appeal held that he “could reasonably be ex-
pected to tolerate” living discreetly upon return to his home country.12 
The Court of Appeal also held that HT would hide his sexuality on re-
turn to Cameroon and therefore did not face a real risk of persecution 
in the future.13 
 In a unanimous decision, however, five justices of the U.K. Su-
preme Court repudiated the Court of Appeal’s analysis, holding that 
the “reasonable tolerability” test is incompatible with the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”).14 The court 
                                                                                                                      
9 See Human Rights Report: Iran, supra note 8 (noting that sodomy is a capital crime and 
describing instances in which minors were executed for engaging in sodomy despite a 
judicial directive banning capital punishment for minors). 
10 HJ, [2010] UKSC at [5]. 
11 Id. at [6]. 
12 See HJ v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 172, [31] (Eng.), 
rev’d, [2010] UKSC 31. 
13 See id. at [44]–[45]. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal used the “reason-
able tolerability” test to determine that the United Kingdom could deny asylum to homo-
sexuals as long as it would be reasonably tolerable for them to avoid persecution by hiding 
their sexuality. See id. at [31], [44]–[45]. The United Kingdom Court of Appeal took the 
“reasonable tolerability” test from an Australian case in which the High Court of Australia 
stated that harm “‘will constitute persecution only if, by reason of its intensity or duration, 
the person persecuted cannot reasonably be expected to tolerate it.’” Id. at [8]. In adopt-
ing the reasonable tolerability test, however, the Court of Appeal disregarded the High 
Court of Australia’s point that “persecution does not cease to be persecution for the pur-
pose of the Convention because those persecuted can eliminate the harm by taking avoid-
ing action within the country of nationality.” HJ, [2010] UKSC at [26]. 
14 See HJ, [2010] UKSC at [82]; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. The Refugee Convention was adopted on July 28, 1951. Id.; U.N. 
High Comm’r for Refugees, The 1951 Refugee Convention: Questions & Answers 4 
(2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3c0f495f4.html. The Convention, which was ini-
tially designed to address the European refugee problem caused by World War II, had restric-
tions limiting its applicability to Europeans involved in events that occurred before January 1, 
1951. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra, at 5, 9. The 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees removed these geographical and time limitations and expanded the scope 
of the Refugee Convention to address refugee problems worldwide. See id. at 5, 7; see also 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (removing 
language alluding to the events that occurred during and leading up to World War II in 
Europe). The Refugee Convention clearly spells out who is a refugee and the kinds of legal 
protection, social rights, and other assistance refugees should receive from state parties. U.N. 
High Comm’r for Refugees, supra, at 4. The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a 
person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
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therefore allowed the appeals, remitted both cases to the AIT, and, hav-
ing precluded the use of the reasonable tolerability test, provided guid-
ance as to the proper analysis for such asylum applications.15 
 In his opinion, Lord Hope of Craighead articulated a standard by 
which asylum should be granted when an applicant will be forced to 
conceal aspects of his or her sexual orientation upon return to his or 
her home country because the applicant genuinely fears that he or she 
will otherwise be persecuted, provided this fear is well-founded.16 For 
Lord Hope, requiring homosexuals to conceal their sexuality is “in-
compatible with the principles of the [Refugee] Convention.”17 More-
over, because homosexuality is a fundamental aspect of identity, homo-
sexuals “cannot and must not be expected to conceal aspects of . . . 
[their] sexual orientation.”18 
 In place of the reasonable tolerability test, Lord Rodger of Earls-
ferry outlined a similar test for determining eligibility for asylum based 
on sexual orientation.19 He concluded that this test is in conformity 
with the purpose of the Refugee Convention, which is to provide pro-
tection in the receiving state not available in the home state because of 
a well-founded fear of persecution.20 Lord Rodger took exception to 
the Court of Appeal’s contention that certain asylum applications “can 
be rejected on the basis that the particular applicant could find it rea-
sonably tolerable to act discreetly and conceal his sexual identity in-
                                                                                                                      
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the coun-
try of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country . . . .” Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra, art. 1. 
15 See HJ, [2010] UKSC at [35]–[39]. 
16 Id. at [35]. 
17 See id. at [21]. 
18 Id. at [35]. 
19 Id. at [82]–[83]. Lord Rodger instructed the AIT that, when considering sexual ori-
entation-based asylum claims, it must first determine whether the applicant is gay or per-
ceived to be gay. Id. at [82]. The AIT must then examine the way homosexuals are treated 
in the applicant’s country of origin. Id. If homosexuals who live openly are persecuted in 
the country of origin and the applicant would live openly, then he or she has a well-
founded fear of persecution and is entitled to asylum. Id. Under this approach, the fact 
that the applicant could avoid persecution by living discreetly would not preclude him or 
her from receiving asylum. See id. If the applicant would live discreetly because he or she 
fears persecution, not simply to avoid social stigma, he or she is entitled to asylum. Id. 
20 HJ, [2010] UKSC at [82]. The purpose of the Refugee Convention is to ensure that 
“human beings . . . enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination and 
that refugees should enjoy the widest possible exercise of these rights . . . .” Id. at [113] 
(quoting K v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] UKHL 46, [10] (appeal taken 
from Eng.)). “The Convention would be failing in its purpose if it were to mean that a gay 
man does not have a well-founded fear of persecution because he would conceal the fact 
that he is a gay man in order to avoid persecution on return to his home country.” Id. at [110]. 
6 Boston College Third World Law Journal Vol. 31: E. Supp. 
definitely to avoid suffering severe harm.”21 He argued that sexual ori-
entation is an “innate or unchangeable characteristic” that is “so fun-
damental to identity and human dignity that it ought not be required 
to be changed.”22 With this understanding, he stated that forcing a 
homosexual person to hide his or her sexuality is as unreasonable as 
requiring a person to conceal his or her race.23 
 Lord Rodger also discussed in detail the toll that concealment 
takes on a homosexual applicant: 
 At the most basic level, if a male applicant were to live dis-
creetly, he would in practice have to avoid any open expres-
sion of affection for another man which went beyond what 
would be acceptable behaviour on the part of a straight man. 
He would have to be cautious about the friendships he 
formed, the circle of friends in which he moved, the places 
where he socialised. He would have constantly to restrain 
himself in an area of life where powerful emotions and physi-
cal attraction are involved and a straight man could be spon-
taneous . . . . [T]he small tokens and gestures of affection 
which are taken for granted between men and women could 
well be dangerous. In short, his potential for finding happi-
ness in some sexual relationship would be profoundly af-
fected. It is objectionable to assume that any gay man can be 
supposed to find even these restrictions on his life and happi-
ness reasonably tolerable.24 
In this way, Lord Rodger expanded the notion of sexual identity to in-
clude aspects of human relationships other than those that arise from 
physical conduct.25 He concluded that the Refugee Convention pro-
tects a homosexual applicant’s right to live as freely, openly, and with-
out fear of persecution as a heterosexual person in all aspects of life.26 
                                                                                                                      
21 Id. at [75]. 
22 Id. at [76] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
23 See id. 
24 Id. at [77]. 
25 HJ, [2010] UKSC at [78]. 
26 See id. (“Just as male heterosexuals are free to enjoy themselves playing rugby, drink-
ing beer and talking about girls with their mates, so male homosexuals are to be free to 
enjoy themselves going to Kylie concerts, drinking exotically coloured cocktails and talking 
about boys with their straight female mates.”). 
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II. Asylum Claims Based on Sexual Orientation in  
the United States 
 The understanding that individuals cannot be expected to conceal 
their sexual orientation because it is a fundamental aspect of identity 
has been accepted in U.S. asylum law since the early 1990s.27 An alien 
who is present in the United States, or at a land border or port of entry, 
may apply for and be granted asylum if the Attorney General deter-
mines that he or she meets the legal definition of refugee.28 A refugee 
is a person who has been persecuted, or who has a well-founded fear of 
persecution, for reasons of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”29 Therefore, a claim for 
asylum must be based on one of these five grounds.30 
 For applicants who cannot successfully make an asylum claim 
based on race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, the concept of 
“particular social group” provides a more flexible opportunity to argue 
in favor of an asylum petition.31 Because it has no statutory definition, 
there is room for interpretation when asylum claims are made on this 
basis.32 Proving persecution based on membership in a particular social 
group is therefore the most successful avenue for sexual orientation-
based asylum claims.33 
 As discussed in the landmark case In re Acosta, the four other 
grounds for asylum can provide a framework for determining what it 
means to belong to a particular social group.34 Race, religion, national-
                                                                                                                      
27 See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding that 
homosexuals are a particular social group for purposes of the Refugee Convention); In re 
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985) (holding that the common characteristic 
uniting members of a particular social group must be one that the members either cannot 
change or should not be required to change because it is “so fundamental to individual 
identity or conscience”); Immigration Equal. & Midwest Immigrant and Human Rights 
Ctr., supra note 3 (“In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno declared as precedent the Matter 
of Toboso-Alfonso case in which a gay Cuban man was found to be eligible for withholding of 
removal on the basis of his membership in the particular social group of homosexuals.”). 
28 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006). 
29 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101; Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, supra note 14, art. 1. 
30 8 U.S.C. § 1101. 
31 See id. 
32 Immigration Equal. & Midwest Immigrant and Human Rights Ctr., supra note 3. 
33 See id. 
34 See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (holding that members of a particular social 
group are united by immutable characteristics). In Acosta, a Salvadoran taxi driver claimed 
persecution based on his status as a member of a taxi cooperative who refused to support 
the guerillas. Id. at 234. The court held the applicant had not demonstrated fear of perse-
cution based on membership in a particular social group because the defining characteris-
 
8 Boston College Third World Law Journal Vol. 31: E. Supp. 
ity, and political opinion all describe persecution based on an “immu-
table characteristic.”35 An immutable characteristic is one that “either is 
beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to 
individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be 
changed.”36 Thus, a person who faces persecution as a result of mem-
bership in a particular social group can be understood to share a 
“common, immutable characteristic” with other members of that 
group.37 The defining characteristic could be anything group members 
“either cannot change or should not be required to change because it 
is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”38 
 Until a 1990 revision to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
homosexuality was treated as grounds for inadmissibility to the United 
States.39 In a pivotal case for homosexual asylum seekers, In re Toboso-
Alfonso, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an immigra-
tion judge’s finding that homosexuals constitute a particular social 
group so as to fall under the protection of the Refugee Convention.40 
This ruling paved the way for asylum claims based on sexual orienta-
tion.41 In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno declared that this finding 
would serve as precedent for asylum cases based on sexual orientation.42 
                                                                                                                      
tics of his membership in the taxi cooperative—that he was a taxi driver and did not par-
ticipate in work stoppages mandated by the guerillas—were characteristics that he could 
change and therefore were not immutable. Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.; see Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d. 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005); Hernandez-Montiel 
v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000). 
37 See Karouni, 399 F.3d. at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093–94; Acosta, 19 
I. & N. Dec. at 233–34; see also Fadi Hanna, Case Comment, Punishing Masculinity in Gay 
Asylum Claims, 114 Yale L.J. 913, 916–20 (2005) (arguing that requiring homosexual asy-
lum-seekers to appear and act gay according to traditional stereotypes would be inconsis-
tent with the conception of homosexuality as an immutable characteristic in asylum law). 
38 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
39 See Brian J. McGoldrick. United States Immigration Policy and Sexual Orientation: Is Asy-
lum for Homosexuals a Possibility?, 8 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 201, 204–05 (1994). The 1952 version 
of the INA excluded “individuals with psychopathic personalities, sexual deviations, or 
mental defect.” Id. at 204. Although homosexuality was not explicitly listed as grounds for 
exclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended to exclude homo-
sexuals from the 1952 INA. Id. at 204–05. The legislative history of the 1990 amendment 
makes it clear “that members of Congress wished to remove homosexuality as a ground for 
exclusion . . . .” Id. at 205. 
40 See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990). Interestingly, al-
though the Immigration and Naturalization Service challenged the immigration judge’s 
finding that homosexuals are a social group, it never challenged his finding that homo-
sexuality is an immutable characteristic. Id. at 822. 
41 Immigration Equal. & Midwest Immigrant and Human Rights Ctr., supra note 3. 
42 Id. 
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 In Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, the Ninth Circuit expanded the defini-
tion of what constitutes a social group to include gay men with female 
sexual identities.43 Building on the language of personhood from Acosta, 
the court declared that sexual orientation and identity are characteris-
tics “so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be re-
quired to abandon them.”44 The court reasoned that homosexuality is a 
component of identity as innate as heterosexuality.45 Rather than expect 
a person to change his or her sexuality, the court stated, it should be 
recognized as a “basic component of a person’s core identity.”46 
 In a powerful affirmation of principles expressed in Hernandez-
Montiel, the Ninth Circuit explicitly declared in Karouni v. Gonzales that 
“all alien homosexuals are members of a ‘particular social group.’”47 In 
reaching this decision, the court adopted the definition of particular 
social group from Hernandez-Montiel, stating that members are “united 
by a voluntary association . . . or by an innate characteristic that is so 
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that mem-
bers either cannot or should not be required to change it.”48 The court 
refuted the government’s assertion that petitioner, a homosexual man 
from Lebanon, could avoid persecution in his home country by ab-
staining from homosexual acts.49 
 Because sexual identity is “so fundamental to . . . human identi-
ties,” the Karouni court found that the INA cannot be read to require 
homosexuals to abstain from homosexual acts in the future.50 There-
fore, the court reasoned, the law cannot impose a requirement of sex-
ual repression on homosexuals because to do so would force them to 
relinquish the close personal encounters that form “an integral part of 
human freedom.”51 In this way, the court entrenched in U.S. asylum law 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d at 1094. In Hernandez-Montiel, the court held 
that a homosexual man with a female sexual identity, who was harassed and raped by the 
Mexican police, was entitled to asylum. Id. at 1099. Noting that sexual identity is a funda-
mental characteristic, the court rejected the BIA’s conclusion that the petitioner could 
avoid persecution simply by dressing like a man and not like a woman. Id. at 1096. Rather, 
the court declared that the petitioner “should not be required to change his sexual orien-
tation or identity.” Id. at 1095. Therefore, because he was “a member of the particular so-
cial group of gay men in Mexico with female sexual identities,” he was entitled to asylum 
Id. at 1095, 1099. 
44 Id. at 1093. 
45 See id. 
46 Id. at 1093–94. 
47 See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1172. 
48 See id. at 1171. 
49 Id. at 1173. 
50 See id. 
51 Id. 
10 Boston College Third World Law Journal Vol. 31: E. Supp. 
the principle that homosexuals cannot be required to hide their sexual-
ity in order to avoid persecution.52 
III. “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” Places Impossible Restrictions on 
Homosexual Service Members 
 In the same year that the United States gave legal recognition to 
homosexuals seeking asylum, hundreds of homosexuals serving in the 
U.S. military were discharged pursuant to “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.”53 
Codified into law in 1993, “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” allows homosexuals to 
serve in the military as long as they do not disclose their sexual orienta-
tion and do not engage in homosexual conduct.54 In so doing, however, 
the law imposes unreasonable restrictions on homosexual servicemen 
and servicewomen.55 Under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” members of the 
military can be discharged from service if they engage or attempt to 
engage in a homosexual act, state that they are homosexual, or if they 
have married or have attempted to marry a person of the same biologi-
cal sex.56 In addition to sexual intercourse, the statute prohibits bodily 
contact like hand-holding and kissing.57 
 Both the financial and human costs of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” have 
been astronomical.58 From 1993 through 2009, more than thirteen 
                                                                                                                      
52 See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1173; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093–94; Toboso-Alfonso, 
20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23. 
53 See Immigration Equal. & Midwest Immigrant and Human Rights Ctr., supra note 3; 
Sharon E. Debbage Alexander et al., Conduct Unbecoming: The Tenth Annual Report on “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass,” Servicemembers Legal Def. Network, 1 (Mar. 
24, 2004), http://sldn.3cdn.net/77d5825b8e0f3454f2_1cm6bgace.pdf. In 1994, 617 ser-
vice members were discharged under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.” Id. 
54 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2006); see also Allyson Collins et al., Uniform Discrimination: The 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy of the U.S. Military, Hum. Rts. Watch, 2 ( Jan. 2003), http:// 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/USA0103.pdf (discussing the requirement that 
homosexuals entirely conceal their sexuality in order to be eligible for armed service). Prior 
to the enactment of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” homosexuals were entirely prohibited from serv-
ing in the military. See Alexander et al., supra note 53, at 14. When President Clinton was 
elected, there was hope that he would completely eliminate the ban on homosexuals in the 
military. See id. at 15. However, vehement opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the con-
servatives in Congress led him to adopt “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” instead. See id. 
55 See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b), (f); Collins et al., supra note 54, at 2–3. 
56 10 U.S.C. § 654(b). 
57 Id.; Collins et al., supra note 54, at 13. The statute defines “homosexual acts” as “any 
bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same 
sex for purposes of satisfying sexual desires” and “any bodily contact which a reasonable 
person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in” such homo-
sexual acts. 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(3). 
58 See Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 914–17 (C.D. Cal. 
2010) (discussing discharge of troops, particularly those with highly specialized training, and 
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thousand military personnel were discharged under the policy.59 Many 
service members discharged under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” have been 
those with critical skills like language fluency, military intelligence, 
counterterrorism, weapons development, and medicine.60 The cost of 
replacing all of the troops dismissed under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” is 
estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.61 
 In addition to the financial costs, “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” has taken 
an incalculable toll on the health and safety of homosexual service 
members.62 They are denied many fundamental rights, including the 
right to be physically intimate with their partners while serving in the 
military.63 They do not have the right to talk about their families with 
their fellow service members.64 They must keep any communication 
with their partners secret because they can be discharged if the gender 
of their partner is revealed.65 The pain of being separated from their 
loved ones for months or years at a time is exacerbated by the inability 
to express intimate feelings over the telephone.66 Finally, the partners 
of homosexual service members may not even be notified if their loved 
one is injured or killed in battle.67 
                                                                                                                      
the high costs of recruiting to replace those discharged under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”); 
Collins et al., supra note 54, at 3 (discussing the widespread anti-gay harassment and the ab-
sence of support services for homosexual service members). 
59 Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 915. 
60 Id. at 916. 
61 Id. at 917; Collins et al., supra note 54, at 4. 
62 See Alexander et al., supra note 53, at 17–18 (describing the “substantial backlash 
against service members perceived to be gay or even gay friendly” after the passage of 
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”); Collins et al., supra note 54, at 23–26 (detailing the harassment 
and violent assaults suffered by homosexual service members). For example, in 1999 Army 
Private First Class Barry Winchell was beaten to death with a baseball bat by his fellow sol-
diers because they suspected he was gay. See Alexander et al., supra note 53, at 20. 
Winchell’s murder was the culmination of months of daily harassment that had gone un-
checked by his superiors. Id. at 20–21. In an investigation following the murder, the De-
partment of Defense learned that as of March 2000, eighty percent of service members 
reported having heard derogatory anti-gay remarks in the previous year. Id. at 22. 
63 Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 923. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.; Alexander et al., supra note 53, at 12 (“Unlike their peers, lesbian, gay and bi-
sexual service members have no teary goodbyes at dock-side. Communication is cryptic, to 
obscure the gender of their loved ones left behind.”). Homosexual service members can 
be discharged even for “writing a personal letter, in a foreign language, to a person of the 
same sex with whom they shared an intimate relationship before entering military ser-
vice . . . .” Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 923. 
66 Alexander et al., supra note 53, at 12. 
67 Id. 
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 Additionally, forced suppression of sexuality has done great harm 
to the mental health of homosexual service members.68 Fear of inad-
vertently disclosing their sexual orientation makes it impossible for 
them to rely on their partners for love and support during difficult 
times.69 Compounding this burden are problems with access to institu-
tional support services.70 Homosexuals are frequently deprived of 
medical care, psychological assistance, and religious consultations be-
cause psychiatrists and chaplains have been known to report homosex-
ual service members who have confided in them.71 
IV. Legal Consistency, Human Decency 
 “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” imposes the same repression on homosex-
ual service members that courts refuse to impose on homosexual asy-
lum seekers.72 U.S. law recognizes the fundamental rights of homosex-
ual people seeking asylum but it simultaneously and systematically 
denies its own military personnel these very same rights.73 This perni-
                                                                                                                      
68 Position Statement on Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals in the Military, Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n 
( Jan. 2009), http://www.apsa.org/About_APsaA/Position_Statements/Gays_Lesbians_and_ 
Bisexuals_ in_the_Military.aspx [hereinafter Position Statement] (calling for the repeal of “Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell,” in part because “[y]ears of psychological research and experience have shown 
the extensive mental toll of keeping one’s sexual orientation hidden”). 
69 See id. 
70 See Collins et al., supra note 54, at 19; Nathanial Frank, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Detailing the 
Damage, Palm Center, 8 (Aug. 2010), http://www.palmcenter.org/files/DetailingCostof 
DADT.pdf. 
71 Collins et al., supra note 54, at 19; Frank, supra note 70, at 8. Both the American Psy-
chological Association (APA) and the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA) con-
tinue to call for the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.” Sexual Orientation and Military Service 
Briefing Sheet, Am. Psychological Ass’n, http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/military-
sexual-orientation.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2011); Position Statement, supra note 68. Noting 
that the military is a “highly stressful environment,” the APA has decried “Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell” for precluding “effective mental health access for gay, lesbian and bisexual military 
personnel . . . .” Sexual Orientation and Military Service Briefing Sheet, supra. For homosexuals, 
living in an environment of “forced secrecy” with the constant “fear of being exposed” is 
“likely to disproportionally increase anxiety and disrupt optimal performance.” Id. How-
ever, because homosexuals are prohibited from revealing their sexual orientation, it is 
unlikely that those suffering from mental health issues will access the necessary support 
services. Id. 
72 See Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d. 1163, 1171–73 (9th Cir. 2005); Hernandez-Montiel v. 
INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–
23 (B.I.A. 1990); HJ v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] UKSC 31, [11], [35], [82]–
[83], [113–18] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
73 See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006); Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d. 
at 1093–94; Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23. 
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cious and unjustifiable inconsistency in the law must be corrected.74 
Rather than continuing to adhere to principles deemed unacceptable 
in other areas of the law, the United States should adopt the view of 
personhood found in asylum law; specifically that sexuality is an immu-
table characteristic that homosexuals cannot be required to hide.75 
 From a policy perspective, forcing homosexual service members to 
repress their sexuality is not a viable option.76 “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” 
puts homosexual service members in an impossible bind—they must 
either conceal a fundamental aspect of their identity or face military 
discharge.77 According to Jonathan Hopkins, an Army Captain dis-
charged under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” homosexual service members 
live in constant paranoia, always worrying that their fellow soldiers will 
question their sexuality.78 Hopkins notes that those who manage to live 
in compliance with “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” “dedicate [themselves] to 
the most epic and despicably unnecessary sense of loneliness one can 
imagine, while working in a profession in which [they] desperately 
need the nurturing support of others.”79 Indeed, Hopkins states that 
those who conceal their sexuality are “destroyed bit by bit on the inside 
each step of the way.”80 Speaking from personal experience, Hopkins 
describes the atmosphere for homosexuals serving under “Don’t Ask 
Don’t Tell” as one of constant stigma and shame.81 
                                                                                                                      
74 See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d. at 1093–94; Toboso-Alfonso, 
20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23; In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985); HJ, [2010] 
UKSC at [35]–[39], [82]–[83]. 
75 See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d. at 1093–94; Toboso-Alfonso, 
20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34; HJ, [2010] UKSC at [11], [35]–
[39], [82]–[83], [113]–[118]. 
76 See Position Statement, supra note 68; Sexual Orientation and Military Service Briefing 
Sheet, supra note 71. 
77 See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d. at 1093–94; Toboso-Alfonso, 
20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34; HJ, [2010] UKSC at [11], [21]; 
Alexander et al., supra note 53, at 12–16; Collins et al., supra note 54, at 2. Indeed, the psycho-
logical impact of repressing such a fundamental aspect of personhood is no less acute when it 
arises in a military setting. See Position Statement, supra note 68; Sexual Orientation and Military 
Service Briefing Sheet, supra note 71. 
78 Jonathan Hopkins, Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, Don’t Be All You Can Be, N.Y. Times at War 
Blog (Sept. 13, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/dont-ask-
dont-tell-dont-be-all-you-can-be. Hopkins is a decorated former U.S. Army Captain who 
graduated fourth in his class at West Point. Id. He served in the military for nine years and 
was deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Id. In August 2010, he was discharged under “Don’t 
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 From a legal perspective, “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” is problematic be-
cause it embodies principles consistently repudiated by courts in both 
the United States and the United Kingdom.82 The law demands self-
denial far beyond the already substantial sacrifices expected of service 
members and their families.83 This self-denial is precisely what courts in 
the United States and the United Kingdom have refused to require of 
homosexuals seeking asylum.84 Homosexuality, like any other immuta-
ble characteristic, is not something that people can be expected to sup-
press.85 Yet, the United States continues to enforce a law that hinges on 
the erroneous notion that homosexual military personnel can and must 
hide their sexuality.86 Thus, the reality recognized in asylum law—that 
sexuality is an immutable characteristic that cannot be concealed— 
should be applied to U.S. Military law, thereby eradicating “Don’t Ask 
Don’t Tell” and putting an end to a law that places impossible demands 
on homosexuals serving in the military.87 
Conclusion 
 The understanding of personhood found in asylum law stands in 
stark contrast to the view of personhood at the foundation of “Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell.” A recent ruling by the U.K. Supreme Court illuminates 
the unworkable principle at the heart of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” spe-
cifically, that homosexuals can and must conceal their sexuality in or-
der to continue serving in the military. In a unanimous decision, the 
U.K. Supreme Court set forth a view of personhood that encompasses 
sexuality. Viewing homosexuality as an immutable principle, the court 
rejected a policy which required homosexual asylum seekers to return 
to their home countries and conceal their sexuality to avoid persecu-
tion. Though this view of personhood has been entrenched in U.S. asy-
lum law since 1994, the United Kingdom’s powerful affirmation of 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093–94; Toboso-Alfonso, 
20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34; HJ, [2010] UKSC at [131]. 
83 See Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 923 (C.D. Cal. 
2010); Frank, supra note 70, at 7; Position Statement, supra note 68; Sexual Orientation and 
Military Service Briefing Sheet, supra note 71. 
84 See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093–94; Toboso-Alfonso, 
20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34; HJ, [2010] UKSC at [131]. 
85 See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093–94 HJ, [2010] 
UKSC at [77]. 
86 See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006); Collins et al., supra note 54, at 2. 
87 See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1171–73; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d. at 1093–94; Toboso-Alfonso, 
20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23; HJ, [2010] UKSC at [11], [35]–[39], [82]–[83]; Collins et al., supra 
note 54, at 2. 
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homosexuality as a fundamental aspect of identity that cannot be sup-
pressed accentuates the unworkable view of personhood found in 
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.” The United States should continue the trend of 
affording legal recognition to homosexuals by adopting the under-
standing of personhood found in asylum law, repealing “Don’t Ask 
Don’t Tell,” and ceasing to place unreasonable demands on its homo-
sexual service members. 
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